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INTRODUCTION 
The title of this book is Aesthetic Marx, and not, for example, Marx 
and Aesthetics, Marxist Aesthetics, or – shifting from the domain of  
‘the aesthetic’ to that of ‘the artistic’, which, as we will see, is not 
automatic and devoid of consequences – Marx and the Philosophy 
of Art, Marx in the Arts, et similia. From our point of view, this 
means that the main focus in this book, regardless of the different 
particular themes and topics that the single chapters of the book 
written by the various authors are obviously centered on, is 
represented by the relationship between Karl Marx, the philoso-
pher, and ‘the aesthetic’ or, say, the aesthetic dimension or com-
ponent of our experience. Where the latter is clearly assumed as 
one of fundamental importance for philosophy to deal with. So, far 
from being a less relevant philosophical discipline in comparison 
to logic, epistemology, philosophy of science or even ethics – as it 
is sometimes argued, or at least suspected, especially in certain 
academic contexts in which the leading philosophical trends have 
a prejudicial anti-aesthetic and, say, purely theoretical basic atti-
tude –, according to this book what Marx seems to confirm is ra-
ther the ‘deadly serious’ character of aesthetics. In fact, the fun-
damental concern of the book seems to be precisely «the role of 
the aesthetic/aesthetics within Marx» but also, shifting perspec-
tive in the transition from one part of the book to another, «the in-
creasing presence of Marx (both as figure and inscription) in con-
temporary artistic practices». 
Precisely for this unorthodox, original and potentially 
groundbreaking approach to the ‘aesthetic Marx’, we have decided 
to dedicate this forum not to a single monographic study, but in-
stead to a collection of writings, or rather to the spirit in which the 
collection has been realized. In the following pages Samir Gande-
sha (Associate Professor in the Department of the Humanities and 
Director of the Institute for the Humanities at Simon Fraser Uni-
versity) and Johan Frederik Hartle (Professor for Art Studies and 
Media Theory at the University of Arts and Design of Karlsruhe) 
will answer a set of questions asked by a group of Italian scholars, 
whose members integrate interests in Marx and Marxism with an 
aesthetic and historical-philosophical approach. As editors of this 
forum, our aim is to stimulate a discussion between different phi-
losophical traditions, a discussion able to draw the theoretical po-
tential of an aesthetic interpretation of Marx into open. The fol-
lowing forum has therefore the task to uncover the most fruitful 
3 Lebenswelt, 13 (2018) 
 
tensions of the book edited by Gandesha and Hartle, and to bring 
to light its innovative method and contents.    
 
STEFANO MARINO 
(Università di Bologna) 
 
On the basis of what has been already observed in the Introduc-
tion, my first question to the book editors is thus if I – as a reader 
of this book, especially its first part – have understood correctly 
their intention to propose a kind of Zurück zu Marx as a way not to 
turn aesthetics into a new prima philosophia, of course, but any-
way to redeem aesthetics from certain prejudices against it and to 
strongly reaffirm its central role in the context of philosophical 
discourse and investigation in general. By referring to aesthetics I 
obviously refer to the particular philosophical discipline that, ever 
since its foundation and first developments in the eighteen cen-
tury, has been devoted to inquiring into ‘the aesthetic’, even de-
termining this way a veritable anthropological turn, the advent of 
a new anthropology centered on the finiteness of the human be-
ing, as noted by Ernst Cassirer (1932). 
By referring to ‘the aesthetic’, in turn, I implicitly refer to the 
fact that the latter, as has been said in the Introduction, cannot be 
completely reduced to ‘the artistic’. But this is precisely what has 
often happened in the tradition of modern aesthetics from the age 
of classical German philosophy and transcendental idealism up to 
the present time. Hegel famously opened his lectures on aesthetics 
with the claim that «their topic is the spacious realm of the beauti-
ful; more precisely, their province is art, or, rather, fine art», so 
that «as a name [aesthetics] may be retained, but the proper ex-
pression for [this] science is Philosophy of Art and, more definitely, 
Philosophy of Fine Art» (Hegel 1843, 1). It might be argued that 
perhaps things haven’t changed so much from the time of Schel-
ling and Hegel in this field, if we think of such philosophical tradi-
tions as hermeneutic aesthetics (Heidegger, Gadamer) or analytic 
aesthetics (Goodman, Danto) that completely identify the question 
of ‘the aesthetic’ with the question of art, or even better of fine art, 
and that are thus characterized by a tendency that has been re-
cently defined «the removal of the sensible» (or: «the percepti-
ble») (see Matteucci 2015). If so, then my next questions to the 
book editors is whether they agree in identifying in Marx, and in 
at least a part of the tradition of Marxist aesthetics influenced by 
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him (let us think of Benjamin’s retrieval of «the theory of percep-
tion which the Greeks called aesthetics» [Benjamin 1936, 41], or 
Marcuse’s emphatic reevaluation of the aesthetic dimension as a 
key for a new, unorthodox-Marxist and revolutionary way of phi-
losophizing), a potential counterbalance or countermovement to 
the abovementioned leading trends in modern and contemporary 
aesthetics. A counterbalance or countermovement that makes it 
possible to overcome: (1) the long-time tendency to simply and 
abruptly identify ‘the aesthetic’ with ‘the artistic’; and, as a conse-
quence, (2) the long-time tendency in philosophical aesthetics to 
reduce art itself to the narrow domain of the arts officially recog-
nized as part of the system of the fine arts, thus excluding other 
practices and techniques that are not of minor importance and 
significance today (for example, those belonging to the domain of 
popular arts and shaping our everyday aesthetic experiences).  
 
JOHAN F. HARTLE, SAMIR GANDESHA 
 
First of all, let us say that this statement succinctly clarifies our in-
tentions in the book as a whole and the Introduction in particular. 
For Marx, it is especially important that these two concepts, aes-
thetics, on the one side, and fine art, on the other, be kept separate 
and distinct. The reason for this is that Marx’s active conception of 
materialism is thoroughly grounded in the finite human body as a 
sensorium. Hence, Marx inverts Hegel’s «labour of the concept» 
and proposes a concept of (sensuous) activity (labour). In this, 
Marx engages in a determinate rather than an abstract negation of 
Hegelian philosophy insofar as, as Adorno notes in Hegel: Three 
Studies, Geist is simply social labour that cannot recognize itself as 
such. Marx sees art as a product and symptom of the alienation of 
class society. With the abolition of such a society art will, itself, be 
abolished as a specialized activity and praxis will itself take on 
qualities we today regard as ‘artistic’. This culminates the nega-
tion of the negation. Recent research undertaken by Douglas Mog-
gach and his colleagues has centered on post-Kantian ‘perfection-
ism’ or the idea that the defining idea of post-Kantian thought is 
the attempt to define historical and institutional conditions under 
which spontaneity (freedom from external determination and the 
freedom to self-legislate) becomes possible. An emphatic post-
Kantian form of perfectionism is one in which freedom super-
venes happiness. Here there is a tension between those who em-
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phasize subject (Fichte and Bauer) and those who emphasize sub-
stance in the Spinozist sense (Feuerbach). Of course, as Hegel fa-
mously points out in the Preface, the Phenomenology systematical-
ly seeks to grasp ‘the True’ not just as substance but equally as 
subject. In an important sense, Marx can be seen as the apotheosis 
of this form of perfectionism insofar as it is brought down to earth 
in the form of a active and creative transforming of Substance 
which is, itself, a self-formation of the Subject. This is what Marx 
means by Species-Being (Gattungswesen). If key to understanding 
the labour process under capitalism is the idea of ‘separation’ (an 
important term for Guy Debord who also criticized the existence 
of art as an autonomous practice) of the workers from the means 
of production and also from each other and therefore also the 
products of their collective labour power, then an artistic under-
standing of human sensuous activity in a post-capitalist society 
entails a negation of this separation. Under capitalism, commodi-
ties go their own way independent of the direct producers which 
means, among other things, workers cannot see their own practic-
al activity reflected in the products of that activity in the way, say, 
a sculptor or a composer can. Under Communism, this would 
change and the direct producers would exert democratic control 
over every aspect of the labour process and, as a result of this, 
would be able to look upon the products of their labour precisely 
as the sculptor or composer might. Indeed, along with producing 
material goods the direct producers would be able to produce 
works both sublime and beautiful, but it would no longer be un-
derstood as art. Importantly, such a form of practical activity 
would be the basis for a positive conception of freedom under so-
cialism – freedom understood as self-determination through the 
creative transformation of the material and immaterial objects.  
Another thing that is pertinent here is that while Hegel does 
seem to reduce aesthetic to ‘fine art’ in his Lectures on aesthetics, 
in the Phenomenology of spirit he suggests that in art we see the 
«sensuous appearance (Schein) of the Idea» through which the 
Absolute is disclosed, which is then subsequently surpassed by 
both religion and philosophy. Notice that for Marx, the criticism of 
religion and philosophy as alienated forms of human experience is 
key to his agenda, particularly in his early writings. Perhaps as a 
way of coming back to the sensuousness of art understood now in 
terms of practical activity that can in no way be restricted to a 
narrow and specialized form of artistic practice, at the end of the 
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day, underwritten, which is to say funded and legitimated by the 
museum. Jacques Taminiaux (1985) argues that, like Plato, Marx 
engages in a negation of art in the service of beauty.  
 
STEFANO MARINO 
 
Finally, I would like to suggest that the fascinating and fitting for-
mula ‘Aesthetic Marx’ may seem to dangerously point in a broader 
and in-itself-articulated direction, namely in the direction of a sort 
of aestheticization and, connected to this, commodification of 
Marx himself. Where by ‘aestheticization’ I do not aim to refer 
here to what usually comes to one’s mind when using this term, 
namely «the spectacular and explicit modalities of configuration of 
the aesthetic […] that on a larger scale are well represented by ad-
vertising and commodification processes [and] testified to by he-
donistic and consumerist practices» (Iannilli 2018, who offers an 
excellent survey of this field): «advertising and commodification 
processes» that, for example, have been defined by Giovanni Mat-
teucci (2016) as the «hyper-aesthetic» dimension of aestheticiza-
tion, in order to differentiate the latter from the «hypo-aesthetic» 
dimension of this complex phenomenon.  
What I refer to here is rather an aestheticization of Marx un-
der the form of his transformation into an aesthetic object or con-
tent in works of art that, for their part, run the risk of being sub-
ject to strong commodification processes in our widely aestheti-
cized age of ‘aesthetic capitalism’. As far as one can learn from the 
book, the use of Marx in the visual arts (and one could perhaps 
add analogous examples in the popular arts: film, pop music, pho-
tography, etc.) is a relevant tendency of our age, which is indeed 
explicitly addressed in the third part of the book. Now, according 
to some scholars it is possible to identify in today’s so-called ‘aes-
thetic capitalism’, and in ‘the artworld’ that belongs to it, a certain 
trend to consciously and even happily turn artworks into com-
modities or even the visual arts into a form of business, for exam-
ple with Warhol, Koons, Hirst and others (see, for example, Di Gia-
como 2015, 151-181; and Mecacci 2017, 9-38, 79-105). Another 
Marxist theorist of aesthetics, namely Adorno, famously wrote 
with his unique negative and prescriptive style that «the task of 
art today is to bring chaos into order» (Adorno 1951, § 143), whe-
reas such expressions as ‘Warhol economy’ or ‘business art’, that 
have acquired a widespread diffusion and common use today, 
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unmistakably reveal the opposite (affirmative-apologetic, rather 
than negative-critical) tendency to accommodate oneself to the 
world order as it is, without any intention to criticize it and trans-
form it. On this basis, my last questions are: (1) whether you 
think, on the one side, that using Marx as the image for commodi-
fied artworks might entail the commodification of Marx himself 
and hence the risk of assimilating or integrating him into the exist-
ing reality; and then (2) whether you think, on the other side, that 
Marx’s and a Marx-inspired aesthetics can provide a contribution 
for a critical understanding of the abovementioned contemporary 
scenarios in art and aesthetics, also in this case as a counterbal-
ance or countermovement to predominant trends in the philoso-
phy of art our time that rather tends to be merely descriptive and 
thus uncritical.  
 
JOHAN F. HARTLE, SAMIR GANDESHA 
 
The danger of aestheticization of leftist politics is real: especially 
since leftist theory in general has often found its refuge in the cul-
tural field – to then being attacked by right wing populist that it is 
elitist and unreal. In fact, this is the argument of (Johan Hartle’s) 
article on «Marx as art as idea», this aesthetic or artistic leftism is 
very much aporetic but this aporia is the very aporia of autonom-
ous art, itself: that it promises an alternative world while merely 
compensating the flaws of the really existing one. This has been 
the Adornian argument ever since: aesthetic autonomy is both ne-
cessary and an ideology. It seems that in contemporary art Marx is 
quite often being referred to as the personification of this contra-
diction.  
On the international art biennials, it seems, you see more 
references to Marx and to the critique of political economy than in 
contemporary debates in the social sciences. And what is so un-
comfortable about this is that the fact that such debates happen in 
the restricted realm of artistic discourse and cultural representa-
tion might, as a form of compensation, end up consolidating its 
shortcomings in manifest political struggles. Such dangers of aes-
theticization are quite concrete in the reception of the work of 
Jacques Rancière, whose political theory strongly emphasizes the 
importance of the orders of perception, of the distribution of the 
sensible, for any kind of politics. We are inspired by this position, 
by historically reconstructing the aesthetic regimes that also 
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ground and make possible what realizes itself in the political and 
economic realm. And, clearly, Rancière, strongly referring to Fou-
cault’s ideas about orders of the visible and the sayable, is not the 
only one to point this out – Antonio Gramsci did so in the early 
part of the twentieth century and, in the German tradition, Oskar 
Negt and Alexander Kluge more recently have also done an excel-
lent work into this direction. The problem seems to begin at the 
moment at which such theories are incorporated into the art 
world and start being interpreted as a justification of the primacy 
of aesthetic politics, that is, of a form of politics that focuses pri-
marily on aesthetic practices and implicitly justifies and legitimiz-
es a social structure that is predetermined by the field specific log-
ics of art with its specific class composition. This becomes its 
blind-spot, as it were. And this is exactly what has happened to 
Rancière and with the recent reception of Alexander in strictly 
artsy contexts, he runs the same risk. Will Marx end up being a 
merely artsy Marx in some cultural milieu? This question very 
much depends if Marx could possibly be separated from the logics 
of capital and class warfare. We don’t see this risk, yet. Rather, art 
practices, because of the specific logics of the field that bind art to 
universal promises, on the one hand (art as a collective good, as 
public resource, as embodied and materialized in public institu-
tions and theorized as ‘the absolute’) and to a continuous self-
reflection of the conditions under which they operate (the whole 
institutional critical tradition avant la lettre introduced by the ear-
ly avant-gardes in 1850 or so, which constituted much of we now 
know as the somewhat autonomous field of art), are a refuge to 
certain types of critical discourse, on the other. Therefore, the aes-
theticization of Marx provides a refuge to leftist politics in the 
field of ideology (or ‘ideological state apparatuses’), in a conjunc-
ture that leaves precious little space for Marxism in the more di-
rect, and in some ways more real, realm of political economy, and 
practical politics. We see this in many trajectories of leftist col-
leagues, who have turned to the ‘aesthetic’, because this was the 
only way to escape Rawls – accepting all the ideological implica-
tions of the aesthetic turn. Less polemically put: the ideology of 
the aesthetic (Eagleton) must not be underestimated and symbolic 
politics, politics of representation and semiotic revolts, must not 
be mistaken for politics in toto. But, as also Eagleton points out, 
Aesthetic discourse and the art field are also sublimations of polit-
ical desires for emancipation that find little possibilities for ex-
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pression where they belong. If you like, you can call this the new 
form taken by the ‘German ideology’ (given the history of classical 
German philosophy) – except, of course, that the aesthetic ideolo-
gy and artsy ‘progressivism’ are neither simply German nor, strict-
ly speaking, philosophical questions any longer.  
 
ROLANDO VITALI 
(Università di Bologna) 
 
I will start by highlighting one of the various aspect of this volume, 
which I think resumes the peculiarity of this philosophical enter-
prise. It can be resumed by the following practical maxim: do not 
presume the inherited concept of aesthetics – as a philosophical 
discipline concerning art and perception – but rather put in ques-
tion the broadly understood aesthetic field through Marx, and vice 
versa, in order to renew the understanding of both. With regard to 
aesthetics, as the book editors argue, the present book «does not 
only (and not even so much) want to confirm the historically-
generated understanding of aesthetics as it is» (Gandesha-Hartle 
2017, xiii); whereas «addressing Marx from such a position means 
to focus on a Marxian way of addressing the aesthetic» which at-
tempts to avoid as much «a classically Marxist» as «a narrowly 
philological, that is, Marxological fashion» (Gandesha-Hartle 2017, 
xiv). From my point of view, this means that both Marx and the 
Aesthetic are questioned as far as the common way we under-
stand them is concerned. Starting from this recognition, I would 
like the book editors to further specify what is precisely unders-
tood under ‘Marxian’ as distinguished from both ‘Marxological’ 
and ‘Marxist’. As the book editors write, their «book aims to re-
construct a Marxian spirit (inseparable as it is from the letter of 
Marx’s writings)» (Gandesha-Hartle 2017, xiv).  
My question is to what extent can this ‘Marxian spirit’ be un-
derstood as the result of the specific aesthetic questioning of 
Marx’s thought, rather than as the interpretative frame within 
which they have based their interpretation. If I may present my 
question under the form of a kind of constructive criticism, so to 
speak, I would like to ask to the book editors if, given the metho-
dological heterogeneity in the Introduction and in the various con-
tributions included in this volume, they nonetheless think that the 
volume can be unified by a relative strong methodological com-
mitment. I ask this because it seems to me that neither dialectics, 
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nor postmodern hermeneutics or other interpretative frames  
provide a common, unifying ground to the Introduction and the 
various contributions; the different contributions can be unders-
tood, by turn, as more ‘Marxological’, i.e. as more historical-
philological contributions (for example, Gandesha’s «Three logics 
of the aesthetic in Marx» and all contributions included in Part III) 
or as more post-modern hermeneutical (for example Hayden 
White’s contribution «Marx: The philosophical defense of history 
in the metonymical mode»). Furthermore, the book editors seem 
to refuse to include their attempt within a ‘Marxist’ tradition, even 
if they also admit to draw out various suggestions from its herit-
age. Certainly this heterogeneity relies very much on the collective 
nature of this enterprise, which implies the diversified philosophi-
cal attitude of the different contributions. Yet, I would like to ask 
how, given this heterogeneity, the book editors understand the 
‘Marxian spirit’ which they claim to have promoted with this vo-
lume. This question seems to me especially crucial if we confront 
this heterogeneity with the relative methodological strength that 
Marx himself seems to claim, for example in the afterword to the 
second German edition of The capital, where, after having com-
plained «that the method employed in Capital has been little un-
derstood» (Marx 1873, 99), he then stresses its materialistic me-
thodology, as much as his debt to Hegel’s dialectical heritage. So, if 
we try to specify more precisely the ‘Marxian spirit’ claimed by 
the authors, it seems to me that it could be understood as the re-
sult of the reciprocal clash between, on the one hand, a broadly 
understood aesthetic field – which includes a focus on «the histor-
ical organization of human subjectivity» (Gandesha-Hartle 2017, 
xiv) – and, on the other hand, a likewise broadly understood Mar-
xian field of inquiring: the result of this clash is both a revisited 
aesthetics and a revisited Marx. In this sense I would like to ask to 
the book editors if it is possible to determine this ‘Marxian spirit’ 
in such a way, namely as the result of this collision between aes-
thetical and Marxian fields. And, if it is so, if and how they intend 
to develop this result. Can we understand this volume as a first at-
tempt to expand the traditional field of the aesthetic, on the one 
hand, and to show the fruitfulness of a Marxian questioning of our 
contemporaneity, on the other hand? In other words, can we un-
derstand this volume as an inaugural project for a yet unfulfilled 
undertaking? And, having this in mind, should we then proceed to 
a more sharp definition of the Marxian way of inquiring, in order 
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to embody this ‘Marxian spirit’ in a sensuous, material and effec-
tive critical theory of the aesthetical field, so to speak?  
My other question – connected to the first – concerns the ex-
tent of this ‘Marxianly’ broadened understanding of the aesthetic: 
if, as the book editors claim, the aesthetic also concerns «the his-
torical organization of human subjectivity», thus including «the 
formative or form-giving capacity of subjectivity» (Gandesha-
Hartle 2017, xiv) and the human «metabolism with nature, histor-
ically mediated as it is» (ibid., p. xiii), what consequences should 
we draw then with regard to the methodological status and the 
specific field of aesthetics? If this broadened understanding im-
plies that «the totality of social life» (Gandesha-Hartle 2017, xiii) 
has to be called into question, can we still speak of ‘aesthetics’ as a 
philosophical field of inquiry, or should we rather consider ‘the 
aesthetic’ as the broad concept which tries to determine the place 
in which objective and socially-determined processes are me-
diated with the empirical, material, subjective individuals? In oth-
er words, can we understand ‘the aesthetic’ as a more refined un-
derstanding of ‘the material’, which tries to overcome the unila-
teral and positivistic heritage of this terminus? 
 
JOHAN F. HARTLE, SAMIR GANDESHA 
 
It is possible to answer both questions together. The fundamental 
methodological commitment that we discern in Marx and the ‘Spi-
rit’ (Geist) we share with him is to the idea of natural history. This 
is the idea that subjectivity is formed in the process of its own 
form-giving activity or, differently put, humanity’s «metabolism 
with nature». This, by the way, means that Marxism must play a 
necessary role in the diagnosing of our current ecological crisis 
centered on anthropogenic climate change. Marx theorized a ‘rift’ 
or fissure that arose in this metabolism with nature under capital-
ist society and this turned on the unbearable pressure placed on 
the soil in producing sufficient food for an urban population that 
was burgeoning as a result of rapid industrialization and therefore 
also urbanization. But what does this mean specifically for the 
aesthetic? Well, if we take seriously Marx’s commitment to histor-
ical transformation, then we are led to understand, and this is 
perhaps best indicated by the arguments of Lukács in his epochal 
«Reification and consciousness of the proletariat» essay in History 
and class consciousness, that philosophy and its disciplines as well 
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as art as specialized practices will look very different in a post-
capitalist society. In this, Debord gets Marx exactly right when he 
implies that art (and aesthetics as a philosophical discipline de-
voted to the study of the beautiful and the sublime) will be ne-
gated in the future. What he means by this can be taken as an es-
sential methodological component of dialectical thinking that 
Marx inherits from Hegel, and this, as Alfred Schmidt emphasizes, 
is determinate negation. Understood in this context, determinate 
negation means that that art will be both cancelled and preserved 
in the future. So, art (and the discipline of aesthetics) would con-
tinue to exist but not as a reified and rarefied practice. In this the 
intentions of the avant-garde (Dada and Surrealism in particular) 
cohere perhaps not so strangely with Marx’s vision. This is, inci-
dentally, also what makes Susan Buck-Morss’ book Dreamworld 
and catastrophe: The passing of mass utopia in East and West 
(2002), on the relation between the Russian avant-garde and the 
Bolshevik vanguard, so interesting. But the key thing is that with 
the overcoming of the law of value, human practical activity will 
become aesthetic insofar as it will entail the panoply of the senses 
as well as the variety of human faculties. It will be meaningful in a 
way that under capitalism certain forms of labour, artistic or phi-
losophical, anticipate but cannot fully embody because of the do-
mination of the law of value. These dimensions of Marx’s thought 
find a new resonance today with the discussion in the context of 
automation via robotics and AI of universal basic income and the 
extension of leisure time. Leisure is hardly the answer to the 
aforementioned problems. What is required is an understanding 
of the importance meaningful forms of work that make possible 
free human self-realization through creative activity, that is, the 
capacity to imaginatively form and shape matter, signs, codes. We 
want to emphasize the word ‘free’ here and this ties back to the 
question of perfectionism mentioned earlier. For free is also one 
main attribute that you find when Marx speaks about alternative 
societal formations, about associations, the associations of free 
and equal producers. Obviously, freedom also means a way of 
loosely connecting elements according to their intrinsic potentials 
and inclinations – subject and substance. Production, under condi-
tions other than capitalism, must mean something like the mobili-
zation and development of capacities from within, from within the 
labour capacities of socialized workers. This has, at all times, en-
tailed aesthetic, i.e. material, sensuous dimensions. 
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MARTA VERO 
(Università di Pisa) 
 
In this book, the authors evaluate different possible methods to 
develop what they define an «aesthetic Marx». This plurality of 
approaches relies on the various aesthetical-philosophical inputs 
Marx received in his youth, such as the Scottish «aesthetic of im-
pact», the Baumgartenian philosophy of sensibility, the post-
Kantian aesthetics of unity and reconciliation. Marx was aware of 
Hegel’s metaphysical solution, the post-Hegelian aesthetics of 
Vischer, as well as Saint-Simon’s and Fourier’s utopian philosophy 
of perception and art. Even though he had a complex aesthetic 
education, which is also shown by various literary tracks and nu-
merous references to poetry in his works, Marx never composed 
an Aesthetics.  
This scenario allows us to examine various possibilities and 
to sift through different aesthetical approaches, in order to recog-
nize the one best encompassing Marx’s philosophy. For this rea-
son, the operation the authors suggest in this book, finding an 
«aesthetic Marx», shows three levels of interest. Firstly, it is stimu-
lating for (a) the aesthetics researcher, seeking an aesthetic-
philosophical approach that could be valid for the current capital-
ist world, a world that «has turned aesthetic» (Gandesha-Hartle 
2017, xi). Indeed, an aesthetic Marx could offer a privileged 
standpoint for evaluating the revolutionary potentiality of aes-
thetics in the current historical stage, as Post-Kantian and German 
Romantic philosopher formulated. (b) Secondly, it is interesting 
for the research field on Marx and Marxism, too. Marx researchers 
could find in this approach a tool to recognize the aesthetic pers-
pective best suitable for comprehending Marx’s works. In the end, 
it could be also useful for (c) the artist or anyone interrogating 
themselves about the role art can assume in this aestheticized ca-
pitalist world. 
These three points of view, that I have just tried to summar-
ize, have something in common. It seems that, in the crisis we are 
living, when the Marxian narration appears to have sadly lost its 
attraction power, an aesthetical approach could be successful. As 
Gandesha suggests in the conclusions of his essay, with the gene-
ralization of fetishization of the real abstraction, namely the com-
modity form, beyond the sphere of simple circulation to every 
sphere of society at the end of World War II, the aesthetic, in its 
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autonomy, and therefore negativity, becomes central to fashioning 
a form of truth that could enable men and women to grasp, in 
their very meditation, the real conditions of their existence (Gande-
sha-Hartle 2017, 19).  
Thus, the negativity of the aesthetic is helpful () to reclaim 
the revolutionary potential of aesthetics, to restore its capacity to 
«provoke the crisis of other, contending discourse such as those of 
science and morality» (Menke 1991); () to rehabilitate the very 
current importance of Marx’s philosophy: an aesthetical approach 
to his work could be more suitable in a time, such as our own, 
which is dominated by a capitalism that has turned aesthetic; () 
to encourage a critical thinking on the social and political role of 
the work of art. Indeed, a work of art can still have a political 
meaning in a Marxian way. As it happens in Walter Benjamin’s 
Einbahnstraße (according to Pickford 2017, in Gandesha-Hartle 
2017, 38-39), a work of art can envelope the interaction between 
praxis and poiesis, encourage an «aesthetic wisdom» (or phronesis, 
according to Pickford 2017, 39-40, or a Machiavellian virtù: Gan-
desha-Hartle 2017, xxxv), promote solidarity of senses between 
humans and create, in the end, a new horizon of meaning, capable 
of constructing a valid alternative view to the bourgeois ideology. 
To conclude with a question: are we coming back to an Early Ro-
mantic interpretation of the role, the potentiality and the goals of 
aesthetics? 
 
JOHAN F. HARTLE, SAMIR GANDESHA 
 
This is, again, very much the way in which Jacques Rancière 
(2002) presents Marx in his text on The aesthetic revolution and its 
outcomes. He interprets the Oldest System Fragment as the para-
digmatic text for Marxian versions of revolution, too. 
This draft would not be just a forgotten dream of the 1790s. 
It laid the basis for a new idea of revolution. Even though Marx 
never read the draft, we can discern the same plot in his well-
known texts of the 1840s. The coming Revolution will be at once 
the consummation and abolition of philosophy; no longer merely 
‘formal’ and ‘political’, it will be a ‘human’ revolution. The human 
revolution is an offspring of the aesthetic paradigm. 
Indeed we believe that the Schillerian and Early Romantic 
legacy is fully present in Marx – and even in later Marxist devel-
opments, that one would not primarily identify as aesthetic (think 
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of Gramsci’s ideas concerning the new intellectual, mediating be-
tween the neuro-muscular and intellectual capacities, or Sohn Re-
thel’s emphasis on the overcoming of the separation of  manual 
and physical labour), the idea of mediation, the idea of an aesthet-
ic reconciliation of unhappy consciousness, or, if you like, a mod-
ern world that has fallen apart. The resonance is especially clear 
with the early Romanticism (Frühromantik) as has recently been 
so fruitfully addressed in the so-called ‘Constellation-research’ of 
Dieter Henrich and in the interpretations of Manfred Frank. For 
example, in his lectures compiled in The philosophical foundations 
of early German romanticism, Frank completely alters our view of 
Romanticism as being allied with German Idealism, in particular 
with that of Fichte, in particular. The early Romantics, especially 
Novalis, take aim at the idea set forth by both Fichte and his pre-
decessor, Reinhold, that philosophy can either take its point of de-
parture from indubitable first principles (foundations) or that it 
could aspire to achieving Absolute Knowledge. Rather, Frank sug-
gests that, philosophically, the early Romantics are committed to 
both epistemological and ontological realism. In this respect they 
anticipate what has come to be a truism about one of the key pre-
mises of Marx’s thought: that Being determines consciousness not 
the other way around. If such Being is accessed through the senses 
then one can see the powerful role that art and literature can be 
seen to play in such an outlook. It is one, we claim, that is shared 
by Marx.  
 
GABRIELE SCHIMMENTI 
(Università di Lecce) 
 
Any attempt to renew a productive discourse between Marx and 
the aesthetics is praiseworthy. The new book by S. Gandesha and 
J. Hartle Aesthetic Marx provides a significant contribution in this 
direction, reconsidering Marxist and Marxian ideas under the light 
of some meaningful concepts of (meta-)aesthetics (Gandesha-
Hartle 2017, xiv, xxxvii) and taking into account the interrelation 
with the conceptualization of Rancière’s «aesthetic regime of art» 
at the very dawn of what one could call «modernity», even if Ran-
cière himself probably would not agree with this term (cf. Ran-
cière 2004, 15-26).  
I want to focus my question on the central concept of «sen-
suousness» (Sinnlichkeit), which the authors grant a crucial theo-
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retical role. On the basis of the sensuous it is possible to establish 
a meta-aesthetic consideration of Marx’s theory, since it «restores 
the importance of the senses and introduces aesthetic strategies 
[…] as irreducible elements of theory» (Gandesha-Hartle 2017, 
xiv). Considering that Marx’s theory starts ontologically – and 
anthropologically – from the concept of «sensuous human activi-
ty» (sinnliche menschliche Tätigkeit), it seems to me not only licit, 
but also unavoidable, to emphasize the aesthetic level of his dis-
course and reflect on its theoretical status – which is brilliantly 
underpinned by both authors and particularly emphasized in 
Gandesha’s contribution on the three logics of aesthetics in Marx’s 
thought (cf. Gandesha-Hartle 2017, 5-8).  
Nevertheless, this background allows me to reflect and reo-
pen the great debate on an old issue, id est, if Marx and Hegel – 
and, in this precise case, their aesthetics – should not be read in 
opposition, without thereby excessively stressing the controver-
sial differences between idealism and materialism. In fact, as is 
well known, when Marx thematized the concept of Sinnlichkeit 
within the Theses on Feuerbach, he clearly argued (These I) that 
Idealism recognized and developed the «active side» of thought, 
even if only «abstractly» (Marx 1888, 121).  
Now, if one carefully examines Hegel’s philosophy of art, no 
tremendous conception is proposed, but rather a progressive one, 
whether taken as such, or if considered in comparison to Hegel’s 
own contemporaries, since he was ascertaining and proposing the 
Befreiung of art from religious constraints in modernity. Without 
departing from the controversial Lectures on aesthetics edited by 
Hegel’s scholar H. G. Hotho in the 1830s, if one gives consideration 
to Hegel’s Encyclopedia and at the recently edited manuscripts of 
his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel himself repeatedly stresses the 
finiteness and the unavoidable sensuous level of the work of art 
(cf. Hegel 1830, § 556), indicating in this sensuousness something 
necessary and essential for art itself. Nevertheless, by means of the 
philological research on the very sources of Hegel’s Aesthetics we 
know that Hegel probably never defined the concept of «Ideal» as 
«appearance of the Idea to sense (das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee)» 
(Hegel 1843, 111; cf. also Gethmann-Siefert 2005, 89-94), thereby 
attributing a negative connotation to the concept of «sensuous-
ness». I am obviously not arguing that Hegel’s theory would be an 
odd form of sensualism, but instead that Hegel attributed an es-
sential role to sensuousness and intuition within the Absolute Spi-
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rit. Now, since it can be argued that Hegel is conceptualizing art – 
at least at a certain level – in a form similar to Marx’s concept of 
praxis and labor (as sinnliche menschliche Tätigkeit), and Marx, in 
turn, is conceiving labor and praxis in a form similar to Hegel’s 
concept of art, I would like to ask the book editors if it is possible 
to let this Marxian stance interact with the meta-aesthetic aim of 
the book. Even if it is licit to consider art in its «positive» and 
«post-Nietzschean» determination, as the authors also suggest, is 
it not a risk to abandon the ‘dialectical’ heritage that Marx’s aes-
thetic thought shows? Is it licit or possible to maintain both heri-
tages? And if it is, in which sense? In other terms, following the 
path suggested by Rancière, is it possible or not to conceive «[t]he 
texts written by the young Marx that confer upon work the status 
of the generic essence of mankind [as] only possible on the basis 
of German Idealism’s aesthetic programme, i.e. art as the trans-
formation of thought into the sensory experience of the communi-
ty» (Rancière 2000, 41-42)? 
 
JOHAN F. HARTLE, SAMIR GANDESHA 
 
We believe that there is a danger of approaching Marx’s text like a 
holy book that merits scholastic treatment and this is in part why 
we take a certain distance from the letter of the Marxian tradition 
and, rather, embrace its Spirit which, as you so well point out, is 
also, as it were, Geist of Hegel. As for Nietzsche, Adorno never 
thought his writings to be necessarily incompatible with those of 
Marx, especially when one looks at the second Untimely medita-
tion on history and also the Genealogy of morals. In fact, one finds 
an alternative critique of what Lukács will call ‘reification’ in the 
early meditation on On truth and lies in a non-moral sense that is 
key for Adorno’s negative dialectic. As for the aesthetic program of 
German Idealism, I think one can see certain parallels with it, as 
described by Rancière, and Marx’s idea of communism in which 
art is both cancelled and preserved in a form of community that 
embodies a post-individualistic conception of autonomy. The 
normative or ethical core of such a community, entails the nega-
tion of alienation insofar as humans will finally find their total 
personalities objectified in their sensuous activity. So, this is per-
haps a significant point on which we differ with Rancière. This al-
so relates to the question of German Romanticism below, insofar 
as we can see – and the early Lukács was sensitive to this as well – 
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in which Novalis’s definition of philosophy as the negation of alie-
nation while dispensing with Hegel’s metaphysics of Absolute Spi-
rit, could be said to anticipate Marx in some respects. In our affir-
mative reading of Marx, however, we might also agree with him, 
as we understand the Marxian programme in terms of the materi-
al history of bodies, i.e. the history of the human sensorium, mate-
rially shaped human subjects. This is at best implicitly present in 
Hegel, whose hierarchical order of the arts also interferes within 
the historical organization of the senses, the human sensorium, by 
turning it into a uni-directional history of the development of one 
specific type of (one could polemically say: Prussian) subjectivity. 
 
MARIO FARINA 
(Università di Firenze) 
 
For what it concerns the general purpose of the book, its original 
approach to a new interpretation of Marx’s thought – most pre-
cisely, the Marxian spirit (Gandesha-Hartle 2017, xiv) – from the 
point of view of the aesthetic seems absolutely promising. Former 
attempts to identify an aesthetic dimension in Marxian texts have 
been devoted, generally speaking, to tracking down a classical de-
finition of aesthetics as discipline in Marx’s philosophical corpus, 
or to pointing to Marx’s supposed artistic, namely literary, compe-
tence. Although the Marxist tradition, especially due to its connec-
tion to the Hegelian perspective, has engendered one of the most 
influential lines of philosophy of art in the nineteenth century, the 
aesthetic dimension in Marx’s production itself has been long neg-
lected before being acknowledged as part of the Marxian canon. In 
comparison to the urgency of social problems, to the alleged foun-
dational character of economy, to the gravity of political issues, 
the aesthetic dimension has been long relegated to an academic 
and so to speak harmless position among the realm of Marxist 
concerns. At variance with this approach, Gandesha’s and Hartle’s 
project aims to re-tie the threads of Marxian aesthetic accounts 
and to reconnect their authors to a broader Marxist family who 
highlighted, in the nineteenth Century, the importance of the aes-
thetic question with its contemporary societal framework. 
In this regard, Benjamin’s outline of a new media aesthetics 
(Benjamin 1936), Adorno’s critical enquiry into ideological sen-
suous expression (Adorno 1970), and Marcuse’s Schiller-inspired 
idea of the aesthetic dimension (Marcuse 1977) provide an elu-
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cidative backdrop to the re-evaluation and re-definition of the 
‘aesthetic Marx’ in contemporary terms. A key question when it 
comes to this kind of reinterpretation of Marx lies however in the 
preliminary definition of ‘the aesthetic’ as a relevant philosophical 
element. As already anticipated in the Introduction, according to 
the editors Marx’s idea of the aesthetic element has to be identi-
fied with the historical and material transformations of the social 
relation between senses and subjectivity. Therefore, provided I 
correctly understand the purpose, the notion of ‘aesthetic’ is to be 
taken as some sort of definition of human activity in terms of an 
exchange between subjectivity and objectivity in which any possi-
ble determination of ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ goes back to its sensuous 
origin or outcome. There is no creation of value, no modification 
of nature, no human need’s organized fulfillment, there is even no 
society without the historical transformation of the sensuous di-
mension of human beings as species-beings. Human beings can 
therefore be defined as those beings whose exchange with nature 
results in a collective disposition of senses and whose most typical 
and true aim is the socialization of those senses.  
My question to you would then inquiry on the possibility to 
further specify the implications of a so understood aesthetic ele-
ment, as well as on the opportunity to achieve, on these premises, 
a viable interpretation of art as the distinctive expression of the 
social modification of the human/nature relation. In this sense, 
the history of art could be taken as the litmus test of the develop-
ment of the human/nature exchange, and the sensuous constitu-
tion of the artwork, along with its purposeless creation, could be 
understood as the expression, as some sort of translation and 
therefore as a commencing dissolution, of the social tensions that 
give rise to the artwork itself. In this respect, the distinctive fea-
tures of a Marxist and materialist reinterpretation of the Hegelian 
idea of artistic activity as a «dissolution of myth» (Formaggio 
1983, 135) come to the fore; as the editors clearly indicate (Gan-
desha-Hartle 2017, xliii), the overcoming of capitalistic contradic-
tions, the overcoming of the social tensions between labor and 
capital, which differentiates the product of alienated work from 
the product of art, corresponds in fact to the end of art as a cir-
cumscribed human activity.  
Art would therefore be a progressive, historical way in 
which humanity sensuously reveals the deep tensions between 
capital and labor; it would be a mode of production able to ex-
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press the always changing configuration of the social conditions of 
labor. On this ground, the development of art would correspond to 
the development of capitalism itself in its progressive revelation 
of its proper contradictory dynamics. As not only do you the edi-
tors, but contributors as well suggest (Gandesha-Hartle 2017, xlii; 
and Khatib, in Gandesha-Hartle 2017, 55), capitalism corresponds 
to an everlasting absorption of the aesthetic and material dimen-
sion in the realm of economic exchange; in this sense, the form of 
commodity as a sensuous supra-sensuous product expresses the 
capitalistic progressive appropriation of every aesthetic element. 
The commodification of the aesthetic world seems therefore to 
indicate the powerlessness of simply sensuous expression. Art 
would no longer be that kind of revelation of capitalistic myth that 
it has always been. In fact, every sensuous expression of value and 
meaning would be absorbed in the economic dynamics of capital-
ism, as the inexorable commodification of visual arts proves, also 
according to the accounts of liberal, non-Marxist authors (Danto 
1986). 
What I suggest, and what I intend to ask you, is whether it is 
possible to identify an aesthetic form which would be able to con-
tinue the above outlined kind of sensuous critical activity; a form 
whose aesthetic element has a sensuous super-sensuous nature 
which is able to escape the ideological moment of anesthetization 
involved in the commodification of sensibility. I would personally 
suggest, in short, to investigate literary narrative as potential can-
didate for such a job. Both the editors’ introduction (Gandesha-
Hartle 2017, xxii-xv) and Samir Khatib’s contribution (Gandesha-
Hartle 2017, 52-56) understand language as a sensible-non-
sensible structure whose semantic is strictly connected to the 
commodity as expression of value. What I intend to suggest is 
therefore the possibility to take narrative (and literary aesthetic 
production in general) as one form which is able to accomplish 
nowadays the task of an aesthetic critique of the commodification 
of the aesthetic itself and at the same time, in a Gramscian sense, 
to provide the means for a non-ideological creation of cultural he-
gemony. While not being a material thing, aesthetic narrative 
could therefore be the super-sensuous structure which is able to 
reveal the contradiction of capital, which is in turn «not a 
thing, but a social relation between persons, which is mediated 
through things» (Marx 1867, 932). 
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JOHAN F. HARTLE, SAMIR GANDESHA 
 
Well, when we speak about the aesthetic in terms of sensuous 
perception we mean it in the form of mediations rather than im-
mediate apprehension. So, bodily suffering, important for both 
Marx and figures like Brecht, Horkheimer and Adorno, among 
others, can indeed be disclosed through theatre, music, painting 
and of course narrative. Narrative is especially important insofar 
as it can be seen as the very model for the kind of mediation that 
we mean. «He who returns from a journey has a story to tell», as 
Walter Benjamin states in his important essay on Leskov. Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of spirit which, of course, can be understood as a 
long explication of experience (Erfahrung) takes the form of a Bil-
dungsroman. Of course, the Frankfurt School as a whole asked 
whether experience itself, in the middle of the twentieth century, 
was even possible any longer. And this, indeed, why so many of its 
concerns were aesthetic – they sought to ascertain the limits and 
possibilities of experience as such. But it wasn’t just the Frankfurt 
School. Starting in the late 1950s, Frantz Fanon’s work sought to 
interrogate the dynamic nature of experience in the context of na-
tional liberation struggles. Fanon’s account of experience, as Gha-
nian-Canadian philosopher, Ato Sekyi-Otu suggests, was at once 
dramaturgical and narrative – that in the overall account of libera-
tion the shifts were disjunctive. It showed the ways in which the 
specific claustrophobic confines of the colonized space – as for ex-
ample brilliantly depicted in Gillo Pontecorvo’s film Battle of Al-
giers (1966) – generated a specific kind of experience of the im-
mediacy of solidarity amongst the colonized which, subsequently, 
gave way to a more differentiated understanding of the social or-
der that now included categories of ethnicity, class, gender and so 
on. The point is this redistribution of the sensible in terms of what 
Marx referred to in chapter six of Capital «On the sale and pur-
chase of labour-power», as a certain «change in the physiognomy 
of the dramatis personae», in the transition from the sphere of 
simple circulation or exchange to that of production, has much to 
offer in contemporary debates on the relative importance of race 
or ethnicity, on the one hand, and class, on the other. It shows the 
dynamic inter-relation of these ‘moments’ as they revealed them-
selves specifically in the context of political struggles. The impor-
tance of the dramaturgy form of presentation of dialectical think-
ing cannot be stressed too much! 
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But indeed, we see Marx at the beginning of a tradition of 
sensuous history, a history of the senses, which has been written 
by other materialist thinkers like Nietzsche, Riegl, Benjamin, Ran-
cière. In the work of Benjamin, specifically, drawing heavily on 
Alois Riegl’s work, the dominant cultural practices and maybe ad-
vanced artistic sensitivities, are also seen as materializations of 
the specific sensorium of a time. This is the historical materialist 
approach to subjectivity as we see it: Subjectivity, the battlefield of 
the artistic, or more broadly, the aesthetic, is the specific organiza-
tion of bodies in and through history.  Such an approach to aes-
thetics is not just an application of pre-given philosophical con-
cepts. According to Tony Bennett, one of the harshest critics of the 
ideology of the aesthetic, this was the ideological implication of 
the discourse of the Second International. Including Marx in the 
philosophical canon would be to blunt the force of the Marxian 
critique of the history of philosophy, not least the specific discip-
line of aesthetics. For these reasons, we are, in contrast, looking 
for materialist conceptualizations of the aesthetic. Marx gives 
more than just keywords here: Think of the whole discussion of 
the historical formation of the senses in the Paris manuscripts, 
think of the discussion in Capital of the historical process it takes 
to produce the subjective preconditions of what we would then 
see as the modern worker, or the Grundrisse in which Marx posits 
the mutual implication of the production of subject and object. 
As you will find, a very large part of our own philosophical 
argument is inspired by the second generation of the Frankfurt 
School. But here you should think less of the Habermasian line of 
tradition but rather of the philosophical propositions brought 
forward by Oskar Negt (an excellent Marxist) and Alexander Kluge 
(one of the most formidable artistic producers in the field of film, 
moving image, and literature, i.e. narrative and dramaturgy). What 
Negt and Kluge suggest in Geschichte und Eigensinn in 1981 (same 
year as the publication of the Theorie des kommunikativen Han-
delns), in essence, is to rewrite the history of living labour, of la-
bour capacities, from the perspective of the formations of body 
and intellect, from the perspective of the specific requirements of 
capital. Negt and Kluge, writing this history with much emphasis 
on the aspects of expropriation and the separation from one’s 
original potentials and capacities, thereby also write the history of 
potential resources of resistance, of obstinacy. In many ways these 
subjective resources are aesthetic and also have to be compiled 
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and organized aesthetically: through narrative, montage, and de-
tournement – practices that you will find extensively in History 
and obstinacy. 
 
